We study the impact of air pollution on the migration of corporate executives. We link data on the opening of toxic-emitting plants with the career paths of executives at S&P 1500 firms. We discover that the opening of toxic-emitting plants increases the rate at which executives leave geographically close firms and the announcements of these executive turnovers are associated with negative and significant market reactions. The results are larger among geographically closer firms, hold only for executives who are physically at the treated firm, are not driven by local conditions or the firm's prior stock price performance, and are larger among executives with more general human capital.
Introduction
A large body of research examines the causes and consequences of executive turnover.
Much of this work explores (1) the relationship between corporate performance and executive turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts and Wruck 1988; Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Denis and Denis 1995; Weisbach 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Murphy 1999; Jenter and Kanaan 2015) and (2) how corporate ownership, board structure, and competition shape this performanceturnover relationship (e.g., Weisbach 1988; DeFond and Park 1999; Kaplan and Minton 1994; Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997; and Volpin 2002) . Less attention, however, has been devoted to assessing the connection between non-corporate influences and executive turnover.
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of toxic air pollutants on executive turnover. An overwhelming body of research shows that breathing toxic air pollutants materially increases respiratory and cardiovascular disease, cancer, and other disorders.
1 Indeed, Landrigan et al. (2017) estimate that nine million premature deaths worldwide, 16% of all deaths, are linked to pollution, with the majority coming from air pollution. Thus, a sharp increase in local air pollution could trigger the migration of executives who have employment options in less polluted areas and this migration could harm corporate valuations. While the popular press provides anecdotal accounts of how pollution spurs executive migration (e.g., Dhawan and Joshi 2017 and CBS News 2013) and research shows both that people migrate away from polluted areas in China (Chen, Oliva and Zhan 2017) and many doctors urge their patients to leave highly polluted U.S. cities (Dewey 2000), we are unaware of systematic research on the impact of pollution on executive migration. We examine whether the opening of toxicemitting plants increases the rate at which executives leave geographically close firms and how their departures affect firm valuations.
We focus on executives-and not employees more generally-for two reasons. First, executives exert a significant impact on corporate policies and performance (e.g., Bertrand
and Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen 2012; Graham, Harvey and Puri 2013; Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 2015; and Pan, Wang and Weisbach 2016) . Second, we can trace the career paths of executives over time and across corporations.
Thus, we ask: When a plant starts emitting toxic pollutants, does this trigger executives in neighboring firms to leave and migrate to areas with less pollution, and are these executive departures associated with a drop in firm value?
To evaluate the impact of pollution on executive turnover, we combine several datasets on toxic emissions and create a unique database on the career paths of executives. First, we assemble data on the career paths for all executives at S&P 1500 firms over the period from 1996 through 2014 from BoardEx and ExecuComp. Thus, we know where executives work, when they depart, and to which firms they migrate. Second, we identify plants that emit airborne toxic pollutants using the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) program. Since 1986, the Emergency Planning, Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) requires that plants in particular industries that use specific toxic chemicals in sufficient quantities and that have ten or more full-time equivalent employees must report the emissions of those TRI-listed toxins. Third, to obtain precise information on the opening years and addresses of these TRI-plants, we match data from the EPA's TRI program to the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) data, which contains data on the universe of U.S. establishments (over 58.8 million establishments) during the past two decades. The matched sample yields 48,317 TRI plants and their opening dates. Fourth, we use EPA data from outdoor pollution monitors on the concentration of airborne pollutants.
We use these data on airborne pollutants to show that TRI plant openings are associated with a material increase in air pollution close to those new TRI plants.
The key challenge to identifying the impact of toxic emissions on executive migration is omitted variable bias. An omitted factor could account for both toxic emissions in a locality and executive migration from that locality, potentially leading to spurious inferences about the causal impact of pollution on executive migration. We use a series of empirical strategies to address this concern. We begin our analyses by examining TRI plant openings. While Currie, et al. (2015) examine the impact of TRI plant openings on housing prices, we evaluate the impact of these openings on the percentage of executives who leave geographically close firms. In these analyses, the dependent variable is the percentage of executives who separate from an S&P 1500 firm in a year (or in two years). The main explanatory variable measures the degree to which the S&P 1500 firm is exposed to TRI plant openings. To measure exposure, we use indicators of whether a TRI plant opens within one (or two) miles of an S&P 1500 firm. Critically, the regressions control for Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-time effects, so that we are comparing S&P 1500 firms within the same MSA and year that are differentially exposed to TRI plant openings. The regressions also control for (a) industryyear fixed effects since industries might concentrate geographically and have distinct pollution and executive migration tendencies, (b) firm fixed effects, and (c) time-varying firm traits, e.g., firm size, growth, leverage, and cash-flow volatility.
In our initial analyses, we also examine individual executives and assess whether an executive is more likely to separate from a firm with greater exposure to TRI plant openings.
To conduct this assessment, we use a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the executive leaves the firm during the next year (or two). The main explanatory variable is again a measure of firm exposure to TRI plant openings. In addition to including all of the control variables employed in the firm-year analyses, these individual-level analyses also control for individual fixed effects as well as the executive's age and tenure with the firm. Moving to individual-year analyses focuses on the separation experiences of individual executives, rather than on the more aggregate firmlevel analyses, and allows us to condition out all time-invariant executive traits.
We find that exposure to TRI plant openings is associated with a sharp increase in executive migration. The firm-level analyses indicate that TRI plant openings are associated with a material increase the percentage of executives who leave neighboring S&P 1500 firms.
For example, the estimates indicate that if a TRI plant opens within one mile of an S&P 1500 firm, the proportion of executives who leave during the next two years rises by 3.7%, which is large since only 22% of executives leave the average firm over each two-year period. The individual-level analyses confirm this finding: executives are more likely to leave their firms when a TRI plant opens close to them. plant opening within two miles of S&P1500 firm f in year t and zero otherwise. As a robustness test, we also confirm that the results hold when using alternative measures of the geographic proximity of TRI plant openings to S&P 1500 firms. In particular, we confirm the paper's findings when using either the number of TRI plant openings or the distanceweighted number of TRI plant openings, where each opening is weighted by the inverse of the distance between the TRI plant and the S&P 1500 firm. Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions, Table 2 gives summary statistics, and 
2.4.Descriptive Information

Empirical Results
Effect of TRI Plant Openings on Major Pollutants
Before assessing the impact of TRI plant openings on the separation of executives from geographically close S&P 1500 firms, we first establish that TRI plant openings are associated with increases in air pollution near those plants. We examine the density (in nanograms/m 3 ) of each pollutant at air monitors close to each TRI plant. Specifically, for each monitor in each year, we identify all TRI plant locations within one or two miles. For each of these monitor-plant pairs in each year, we assign the density of the pollutants recorded by the relevant air monitor, so that we have multiple observations for each TRI plant in a year when there is more than one monitor within one or two miles of the plant. If two TRI plants are within one or two miles of the same monitor, we assign each of these monitorplant pairs the same pollutant density. Thus, we define p m,l,t as the density of pollutant p measured at monitor m that is within one or two miles of plant l in year t. Our main explanatory variable, Dummy (Plant is Operating), is a dummy variable that equals zero in the years before a TRI plant opens and one afterwards. The regressions also control for year fixed effects ( ! ) and monitor-plant fixed effects ( !,! ), so that
where is a constant, !,!,! is the error term, and the estimated value of provides information on the impact of a TRI plant opening on pollution levels at monitors within one or two miles of the plant. Table 3 reports the results of ten regressions, one for each pollutant. Table 3 shows that TRI plant openings induce a statistically significant and economically large increase in pollution. The TRI plant openings trigger an increase in each of the specific air pollutants, as measured by air pollution monitors within both one and two miles of the plant, except for lead. The last column of Table 3 provides information on the economic magnitudes of the estimated coefficient on Dummy (Plant is Operating) for each pollutant by computing the estimated change in the pollutant as a percentage of the pollutant's average across all monitors in the country. For example, when examining the toxin Benzene within two miles of a plant, the estimated coefficients indicate that a TRI plant opening is associated with an increase of 9.69 nanograms/m 3 of lead in the air, which is 18.3%
of the mean density of lead recorded by an average monitor.
TRI Plant Openings and Executives Migration: Firm-year Analyses
We next examine the relationship between TRI plant openings and the percentage of executives who leave neighboring S&P 1500 firms. For brevity, we refer to S&P 1500 firms as "firms," and use the designator "f." The dependent variable in these firm-year regressions is either (1) !,! ! : the percentage of executives who leave firm f during year t, (i.e., the number of executives who leave the S&P 1500 firm between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t divided by the total number of executives in that firm, f, at the end of year t-1) or (2) !,! ! : the percentage of executives who leave firm f during years t and t+1 (i.e., the number of executives who leave the firm during the two years between the end of t-1 and the end of t+1 divided by the total number of executives in f at the end of year t-1).
Thus, we estimate the following regression:
where the dependent variable is either !,! ! or !,! ! , and TRI Open f,t is one of the two time- Third, firm-specific characteristics might affect the self-selection of executives out of particular geographical areas. To condition out all time-invariant firm effects, we control for firm fixed effects. Below, we address additional concerns with these evaluations of the relationship between TRI plant openings and executive departures.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that TRI plant openings are associated with an economically large and statistically significant increase in the percentage of executives who leave S&P 1500 firms close to the new TRI plants. Across all specifications, each of the three measures of TRI Open enters positively and significantly. This holds when the dependent variable is either the proportion of executives who leave the firm during year t ( !,! ! ) or the proportion of executives who leave during year t and t+1 ( !,! ! ). Furthermore, the results are robust to excluding or including the time-varying firm characteristics and the estimated coefficients on the TRI Open variables change little when conditioning on firm traits. The estimated coefficients are economically meaningful. For example, using regression (11), if one TRI plant opens within two miles of an S&P 1500 firm, the proportion of executives who leave during the next year rises by 2.22%, where 11.9% of executives leave the average firm every year.
3.3.Additional Omitted Variable Concerns
A key concern is omitted variables. Executives might separate from firms because of an omitted factor, such as local economic conditions, not because of TRI plant openings.
Although we control for MSA-year fixed effects, there might be time-varying, within-MSA local factors that trigger both executive separations and the opening of TRI plants. Since the density of pollution dissipates with distance (see, e.g., Currie et al., 2015) , we test whether the relationship between TRI plant openings and executive migration falls as the distance between the TRI plant and the firm grows.
As shown in Panel B of As a second test, we distinguish among leaders within a firm and conduct a placebo test. If a firm's leaders migrate because they are physically exposed to pollution, then we should observe that leaders who are physically present at their firms on a regular basis would be more likely to leave than those who are not physically based at the firm's headquarters. To evaluate this, we examine non-executive directors, who are less likely than executives to work at the firm on a regular basis. Thus, the placebo test posits that if physical exposure to pollution is driving migration, then we should not observe an impact of TRI plant openings on the rate of non-executive director departures. We define the rate of non-executive director migration as the percentage of non-executive directors who leave firm f during year t (or during years t and t+1), divided by the total number of non-executive directors in that firm, f, at the end of year t-1).
As shown in Panel C of Table 4 , the results of the placebo test are consistent with the interpretation that physical exposure to pollution drives executive migration. For nonexecutive directors-those who are less likely to be physically present at their S&P 1500 firms on a regular basis, we find no relationship between TRI plant openings and migration.
However, as shown in Panel A, for executives, there is a strong, negative relationship between the opening of a TRI plant and the rate of executive departures.
As a third test, we address the concern that executives might separate from firms involuntarily because of poor firm performance, not because they are exposed to pollution. If TRI plant openings are more likely to occur around failing S&P 1500 firms and failing firms are more likely to fire executives, then the Panel A results in Table 4 could reflect the impact of poor firm performance on both executive separations and TRI plant opening, not the impact of pollution on executive migration.
To address this concern, we eliminate S&P 1500 firms that were performing poorly during the year prior to TRI plants opening close to those firms. In particular, in Panel D of As shown in Panel D of Table 4 , we continue to find a strong impact of TRI plant openings on executive migration after excluding poorly performing firms. In unreported robustness tests, we find that these results hold when using other stock price reduction cutoffs besides 10%. The results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the view that TRI plant openings increase pollution around geographically close S&P 1500 firms and executives working in those firms have higher probabilities of leaving those exposed firms, regardless of the firm's stock price performance before the TRI plant opening. 
TRI Openings and Executive Migration: Individual-year Analyses
To provide more information on the relationship between TRI plant openings and executive departures from neighboring firms and to address additional identification concerns, we turn our focus from the proportion of executives leaving firms and instead trace the decisions of individual executives over time. In these individual-year analyses, we evaluate the change in the probability that an executive leaves an S&P 1500 firm when a TRI plant opens nearby. By studying individuals rather than the group of executives at firms, we control for all time-invariant, and several time-varying, traits of each executive.
In these regressions, the dependent variable is either !,!,! Thus, we estimate the following linear probability models: with an 8.52% increase in the probability that the executive leaves the firm within two years, where 18.3% of executives leave every two years in the average firm.
Differentiating by Generalist and Specialist Executives
We next assess whether executives with different human capital skills respond differently to TRI plant openings. We hypothesize that when TRI plant openings increase toxic air pollutants, executives at nearby firms who have skills that are in stronger demand at other firms will be more likely to relocate than executives with more firm-specific skills. This hypothesis predicts that when executives are "treated" with air pollution, the executives with more general human capital will be more likely to leave the firm than executives with more firm-specific human capital.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we examine the degree to which CEOs have general human capital skills, i.e., skills that are valued highly at other firms. We use the Generalist CEO Index constructed and analyzed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) that gauges the extent to which a CEO's skills are transferrable across firms and industries. The Generalist CEO Index varies over time for each individual and reflects information on the numbers of past positions, firms, and industries and whether the executive was a CEO in the past and the complexity of the organizations in which the CEO was employed. We then test whether there is a larger increase in the rate of departures of CEOs with more general human capital skills when a TRI plant opens nearby.
The regression specification and estimation procedures are the same as in equation (3) except that we add an interaction term between TRI Open and Generalist CEO Index.
Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
where the variables are defined as above. If > 0, then this would suggest that CEO departures are more likely in response to a TRI plant opening when the CEO has more general, and hence more transferable, skills.
As shown in Table 6 , the evidence is consistent with the view that when firms are exposed to air pollution from the opening of a TRI plant, executives with more general human capital skills leave firms more frequently during the next years than executives with more firm-specific skills. These results are reported in regressions (7) - (12) 
Extensions
We now extend the results by examining two additional implications of the view that TRI plant openings increase toxic emissions that induce executives at neighboring firms to leave. We explain each implication and then provide an empirical evaluation.
CARs around Executives' Turnover Announcement
First, if there are costs associated with replacing well-performing executives (e.g.,
Gabaix and Landier 2008) and air pollution triggers the departure of executives in general,
and not simply the departure of poorly-performing executives, then air pollution-induced migration will tend to reduce the firm's stock price. That is, if air pollution is causing an otherwise sound executive to leave a firm, this is likely to have an adverse effect on the firm as suggested by the work of Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Denis and Denis (1995).
Since we showed ( We examine the relationship between the announcement date of executive departures and their firm's cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). To obtain announcement dates, ExecuComp provides some of those dates and we hand-collected most dates from Factiva news and 8-K filings. In particular, using the announcement dates from ExecuComp, our sample is 1,772. We then searched Factiva and 8-K filings for information on each executive at S&P 1500 firms over our sample period to discern the announcement date of executive departures. This increased our sample to 4,365, for which we can compute the firms' CARs around those dates. We report the results with our larger sample, and note that the results hold with the smaller, ExecuComp-only sample.
To compute the CARs, we use security prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We examine CARs over the 5-day window from two days before until two days after the announcement day. Setting the announcement day as day 0, the CAR window is therefore indicated as (-2, +2). We use three standard models to compute abnormal returns. The 1-factor abnormal return is computed as the firm's return minus the market index return. Following Brown and Warner (1985), we define 3-factor and 4-factor abnormal returns by using the difference between actual and projected returns. To compute projected returns, we (1) regress the firm's daily return on the value-weighted returns on the CRSP equally weighted market portfolio over the 200-day period from the 210th trading day through the 11th trading day before the announcement date of each deal and (2) use the estimated parameters to compute the projected returns during the 5-day event window (-2, +2). For the 3-factor model, we use the Fama-French benchmark factors of Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML as regressors, where Rm-Rf is the value-weighted market return minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on three small portfolios minus the average return on three big portfolios, and HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios. The numbers are obtained from Kenneth R. French's website. The 4-factor model adds the FamaFrench momentum factor, which is constructed from six value-weighted portfolios formed using independent sorts on size and prior returns of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. 8 We report the results in Table 7 using the 4-factor model, but all of the results hold using either the 1-or 3-factor models to construct 5-day CARs around the announcement date. Table 7 provides tests of whether there are significant differences between the CARs around announced departures of executives from (1) firms exposed to TRI plant offerings and (2) firms unexposed to such openings.
As shown, when executives announce their departures from S&P 1500 firms exposed to TRI plant openings, the CARs of those firms fall significantly more than when executives depart from unexposed firms. 9 This is consistent with the views that (a) the toxic releases from TRI plant openings induce some otherwise well-performing executive at neighboring firms to separate from those firms, so that the distribution of executive departures following TRI plant openings at neighboring firms has a higher proportion of these voluntary departures than the executive departures from firms unexposed to TRI plant opening and (b) voluntary executive departures have a larger adverse influence on stock prices than executive departures for other reasons, including poor firm performance or expected poor performance.
These findings suggest that TRI plant openings have material effects on the executives and shareholders of neighboring firms.
4.2.Comparison of Pollutant Density between New Areas and Old Areas
Finally, the view that pollution triggers executive migration provides predictions about where those departing executives go. If executives leave S&P 1500 firms because of pollution, then we should observe these executives moving to firms in less polluted areas. To assess whether this holds, we first identify the location of the executive's new firm through BoardEx and ExecuComp. We then compute the pollutant levels in the first year after the executive moves to the new firm using EPA monitor data. Specifically, for each pollutant, we compute the pollutant's level at the executive's "old firm" and its level at the new firm, where monitor nearest to the firm measures the pollutant level. Since not all executives who leave S&P 1500 firms following TRI plant closings migrate to other S&P 1500 firms, these analyses materially reduce the sample size. Thus, we simply provide the results for executives leaving S&P 1500 firms after a TRI plant opens within two miles of the firm.
As shown in Table 8 , executives who leave S&P 1500 firms after a TRI plant opens nearby tend to move to firms in less polluted parts of the country. These findings are not surprising given that (a) TRI plants increase pollution and (b) executives have a higher propensity to migrate following the opening of TRI plants close their firms. Nevertheless, it is valuable to confirm that when executives leave a firm following the opening of a geographically close toxic emitting plant, they tend to find new executive positions in firms located in areas with lower pollution levels.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the impact of toxic emissions on the migration of corporate executives from neighboring firms. We merge data on TRI plant openings-plants that emit toxic air pollutants-with information on the career paths of executives at all S&P 1500 firms. We then ask: When one firm starts emitting toxic pollutants, does this induce the migration of corporate executives from neighboring firms and are such migrations associated with a drop in the CARs of those firms?
We discover that the opening of toxic emitting plants increases the rate at which executives leave geographically close firms. These findings are especially pronounced among executives with more general human capital skills and are not driven by executives at firms experiencing poor stock price performance. We also show that increases in executive migration following the opening of geographically close toxic emitting plants hold for executives who are most likely to work regularly and physically at the firm. Indeed, the findings do not hold for non-executive directors, who are unlikely to be physically present at the firm on a regulator basis and therefore less likely to be affected by the TRI plant-induced increase in air pollution. In addition, we show stock returns fall when executives announce their departures following the opening of toxic-emitting plants. These analyses suggest that an additional, costly externality of air pollution is the migration of executives from geographically close firms. (2) provides variable definitions of the dependent, independent, and control variables. The variables are ordered according to when they appear in the tables.
Sample Construction
Firm-Year Sample Each row is an S&P 1500 firm's observation in a year. Data are constructed from EPA, BoardEx and Compustat.
Monitor-Plant-Year Sample For each functioning monitor in a year, we match the TRI plant location with it and construct monitor-plant pairs. Each row is a pollutant's density (in nanogram/m 3 ) in a monitor-plant pair in a year. A dummy shows whether the plant is operating or not within 10 miles of the monitor in a given year. Data are from EPA.
Person-Year Sample
Each row is an executive's observation in an S&P 1500 company in a year. Data are constructed from EPA, BoardEx and Compustat.
Dependent Variables
1-factor (3-factor, 4-factor) CAR (-2，+2) 5-day CAR during the window (-2, +2), where day 0 is the date that an executive announces her leaving. We define abnormal returns by using the difference between actual and projected returns, where we estimate projected returns as follows: (1) based on 1-factor (3-factor, 4-factor) stock abnormal return model, regress the S&P 1500 firm's daily return on the returns on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over the 200-day period from the 210th trading day through the 11th trading day before the announcement date and collect the estimated coefficients and (2) use the estimated coefficients to compute the projected returns during the 5-day event window (-2, +2). Data are from CRSP.
All Other Compensation
The value of an executive's all other compensation. In thousand USD. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Dummy (Leave the Company in One Year)
In the person-year level data, for each executive that was in the S&P 1500 company in year y-1, the dummy equals one if she was in the company in year y+1, and equals zero if she was not in the company in year y+1. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Dummy (Leave the Company in Two Years)
In the person-year level data, for each executive that was in the S&P 1500 company in year y-1, the dummy equals one if she was in the company in year y+2, and equals zero if she was not in the company in year y+2. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Percentage of Executives Who Left the Companies in One Year
In the firm-year level data, for each S&P 1500 firm, first construct the list of all executives from BoardEx and ExecuComp in year y-1 (say n executives in total), and the list of all executives in year y+1; then construct the list of executives who were in the company in year y-1 but not in year y+1 (say there are m executives who have left the company); then the percentage of executives who left the company is defined as m/n. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Percentage of Executives Who Left the Companies in Two Years
In the firm-year level data, for each S&P 1500 firm, first construct the list of all executives from BoardEx and ExecuComp in year y-1 (say n executives in total), and the list of all executives in year y+2; then construct the list of executives who were in the company in year y-1 but not in year y+2 (say there are m executives who have left the company); then the percentage of executives who left the company is defined as m/n. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Percentage of Non-executive Directors Who Left the Companies in One Year
In the firm-year level data, for each S&P 1500 firm, first construct the list of all non-executive directors from BoardEx and ExecuComp in year y-1 (say n nonexecutive directors in total), and the list of all non-executive directors in year y+1; then construct the list of non-executive directors who were in the company in year y-1 but not in year y+1 (say there are m non-executive directors who have left the company); then the percentage of non-executive directors who left the company is defined as m/n. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Percentage of Non-executive Directors Who Left the Companies in Two Years
In the firm-year level data, for each S&P 1500 firm, first construct the list of all non-executive directors from BoardEx and ExecuComp in year y-1 (say n nonexecutive directors in total), and the list of all non-executive directors in year y+2; then construct the list of non-executive directors who were in the company in year y-1 but not in year y+2 (say there are m non-executive directors who have left the company); then the percentage of non-executive directors who left the company is defined as m/n. Constructed from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Proportion of Being a Chairperson of Board
The average proportion of whether a person has been a Chairperson of Board in the current or previous companies. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Proportion of Being a CEO
The average proportion of whether a person has been a CEO in the current or previous companies. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Shares Compensation
The value of an executive's compensation in the form of granted shares. In thousand USD. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Total Current Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
The total current compensation of an executive, including salary and bonus. In thousand USD. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Years of Being an Executive
The total number of years that the person has been an executive in the current or previous companies. Obtained from BoardEx and ExecuComp.
Independent Variables
TRI Open within 1 Mile At the firm-year level, it equals one if there is at least one TRI plant open within 1 mile of an S&P 1500 firm's headquarter location in a given year.
TRI Open within 2 Miles At the firm-year level, it equals one if there is at least one TRI plant open within 2 miles of an S&P 1500 firm's headquarter location in a given year.
Dummy (Plant is Operating)
In the monitor-plant-year sample, this dummy shows whether the plant is operating (=1) or not (=0) within 5 miles of the monitor in a given year.
Generalist CEO Index General Ability Index defined in Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) winsorized at 1%. It captures the skills of the CEO that are transferrable across firms and industries, instead of firm-specific skills. The index gives close to equal weights to the past number of positions, firms, and industries and a lower weight to the past CEO and conglomerate experiences. Executives who left the S&P 1500 firms with at least one plant opening within 2 miles in the past two years
Control Variables
Executives who left the S&P 1500 firms with at least one plant opening within 2 miles in the past one year
